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The 1960 Société Eky Ruling: A Major Turning Point in French Administrative Law

On February 12, 1960, the Conseil d’État ruled on a seemingly technical dispute: a company challenged fines established by decree. The decision…

Avocat en robe noire tenant un traité juridique dans le couloir d'un palais de justice parisien, illustrant l'arrêt Société Eky et le droit administratif français de 1960

On 12 February 1960, the Conseil d’État ruled on a dispute that seemed technical: a company was challenging fines created by decree. The decision handed down that day went far beyond the question of counterfeit means of payment. It required the administrative courts to recognize that the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution—and, through it, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen—binds the administration as a set of genuine legal rules.

Why the 1958 Preamble posed a problem before the Eky ruling

Before 1960, one question remained unresolved: did the Constitution’s Preamble have real binding force? Some legal scholars viewed it as a statement of intent—a solemn text with no direct effect on administrative acts.

The Preamble to the Constitution of 4 October 1958 refers to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution. These texts proclaim fundamental principles: the legality of penalties, individual liberty, and equality before the law. But proclaiming a right is not enough to make it enforceable in court.

This uncertainty worked in favor of the regulatory authorities. In matters involving minor offences, the government had broad discretion. Article 34 of the Constitution reserves rules on felonies and misdemeanors to statute, while regulations determine minor offences. This division of powers, later codified in Article 111-2 of the Criminal Code, was already taking shape in the 1958 texts.

It was in this context that Société Eky brought its case before the Conseil d’État. A decree of 23 December 1958 had created new minor offences in the Criminal Code. The company argued that these provisions violated Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration, which establishes the principle of legality of offences and penalties. By invoking this text, Société Eky compelled the Conseil d’État to rule on the legal status of the Preamble.

For a closer look at the Conseil d’État’s reasoning in this case, the 1960 Société Eky ruling has been examined in detail, shedding light on its significance in administrative law.

Official French legal document from the 1960s on an antique oak desk, with handwritten annotations, evoking the Conseil d'État's historic decision in the Société Eky case

Constitutional review of regulatory acts: what the Conseil d’État agreed to review

The Conseil d’État, sitting in chambers, issued its ruling on 12 February 1960 in two parts. The first concerned an ordinance adopted under Article 92 of the Constitution, a transitional provision that temporarily vested legislative power in the government. The court declined to review the act: because it had been adopted in the exercise of legislative power, it was not subject to an action for annulment for excess of power.

The second part concerned a decree, a conventional regulatory act. Here, the reasoning changed. The administrative court agreed to review the decree against the Preamble. It recognized that the principles set out in the 1789 Declaration, to which the 1958 Preamble refers, have greater legal authority than regulations.

This distinction may seem subtle, but it is decisive. In practical terms, it means that:

  • A regulatory act (decree or order) may be annulled by the Conseil d’État if it violates a principle in the Preamble or the 1789 Declaration.
  • An act adopted in the exercise of legislative power (an ordinance under Article 92 or a law passed by Parliament) cannot be challenged before the administrative courts on this basis.
  • The administrative court cannot set aside a law that acts as a “screen” between the Constitution and the regulatory act: this is the “screen law” doctrine, which limits the scope of review.

In practice, Eky opened the door to constitutional review of administrative acts only, not laws. The Conseil d’État did not become a constitutional court. It checks that regulatory authorities comply with constitutional rules when no statute stands in the way.

The Eky ruling and the constitutional block: a milestone, not the final word

A common mistake is to present the Société Eky ruling as the decision that established the constitutional block. The reality is more nuanced. Eky recognized the legal force of the Preamble before the administrative courts, but it was the Constitutional Council that formally incorporated the Preamble and the 1789 Declaration into the constitutional block in its decision of 16 July 1971 on freedom of association.

These two decisions came from different courts and had different effects. In 1960, the Conseil d’État held that the administration must respect the principles in the Preamble. In 1971, the Constitutional Council held that the legislature itself was bound by them. One reviews regulations; the other reviews statutes.

Why does this distinction matter? Because it determines who can invoke the Constitution, and against what kind of rule. Before 1971, a law could theoretically violate the 1789 Declaration without any court being able to strike it down. Eky addressed this problem only in relation to regulatory acts.

What the ruling changed for administrative litigation

After 1960, anyone challenging a decree or order before the Conseil d’État could invoke the 1789 Declaration or the 1946 Preamble as a legal standard. The administrative court thus gained a broader tool for review than simply checking compliance with statutes.

This mechanism remains in use in contemporary administrative litigation. An action for annulment for excess of power against a regulatory act can still be based on a constitutional principle, provided no statute stands between the challenged act and the Constitution.

Facade of the Palais Royal in Paris, home to the Conseil d'État, with an administrative law researcher walking beneath the colonnade, symbolizing the historical significance of the 1960 Société Eky ruling

Regulatory powers in criminal matters: the overlooked dimension of the Eky ruling

Most commentary focuses on the question of the Preamble. The Eky ruling also sheds light on the limits of regulatory powers in criminal matters. The challenged decree created minor offences, an area in which the government can act without going through Parliament.

The 1958 Constitution divides powers between statute and regulation. Article 34 assigns to statute the definition of felonies and misdemeanors, as well as the penalties applicable to them. Regulations define minor offences and their penalties, under a division of powers now reflected in Article 111-2 of the Criminal Code.

By upholding this regulatory power in principle while requiring compliance with the 1789 Declaration, the Conseil d’État established a clear framework. The government may create minor offences by decree, but in doing so it may not violate the principle of legality of penalties (Article 8 of the 1789 Declaration) or the fundamental safeguards of civil liberties.

The Société Eky ruling of 12 February 1960 remains a key reference in administrative law textbooks because it brings together two questions that are still relevant today: the place of the Constitution in the hierarchy of administrative rules, and the limits of regulatory powers when they affect civil liberties. This dual significance makes the ruling more substantial than its constitutional dimension alone.

The 1960 Société Eky Ruling: A Major Turning Point in French Administrative Law